February 17, 2010

Has Pakistan turned against the Taliban?

By: AF Editors

Dan Twining, who studied Pakistan closely during his time at the State Department, takes a closer look at why Pakistan might have cooperated in the capture of Taliban #2, Mullah Baradar. The optimistic interpretation is that Pakistani intelligence has finally recognized that the Taliban are as much of a threat to Pakistan as they are to Afghanistan. Alternately,

In return for Pakistani cooperation over the next 18 months…one could imagine a private U.S. understanding with Pakistani armed forces commander General Kayani that, once Western forces withdraw from Afghanistan, Pakistan can enjoy a free hand to resume its special relationship with the country’s post-Karzai leadership in its continued quest for strategic depth against India.

The notion of a deal is certainly interesting, but I have questions. The current Afghan leadership seems to resent Pakistan deeply for supporting the Taliban. If the Taliban insurgency fails, that will entrench an anti-Pakistan leadership in Kabul. Why would Pakistan want that?

Also on Shadow Government, Kori Schake raises some interesting questions about Baradar’s interrogation,

Is the administration permitting the Pakistani interrogators to employ harsh methods the administration has put off limits to American intelligence professionals?…

Is the administration confident the procedures applied to other terrorists, say, Christmas bomber Abdulmutallab, are adequate to attain the information that could save lives? Will the rules not apply because of the high value of this particular individual? Will he seek to have him extradited to the United States for trial? Will he get offered a deal in return for information?…

My guess is that the Obama administration will try and treat the case of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar as sui generis, keeping secret as much information as possible beyond the fact of his capture. But their every decision in the Baradar case will be a precedent and a proving ground for administration policies on detention, rendition, interrogation, and ultimately dispensation of captured terrorists.