October 21, 2009

“Af-Pak” or different wars?

By: AF Editors

Pakistan has Al Qaeda and nuclear weapons. Isn’t Afghanistan just a sideshow?

Option 1: Yes, Pakistan is what really matters. Newsweek:

Joe Biden had a question. During a long Sunday meeting with President Obama and top national-security advisers on Sept. 13, the VP interjected, “Can I just clarify a factual point? How much will we spend this year on Afghanistan?” Someone provided the figure: $65 billion. “And how much will we spend on Pakistan?” Another figure was supplied: $2.25 billion. “Well, by my calculations that’s a 30-to-1 ratio in favor of Afghanistan. So I have a question. Al Qaeda is almost all in Pakistan, and Pakistan has nuclear weapons. And yet for every dollar we’re spending in Pakistan, we’re spending $30 in Afghanistan. Does that make strategic sense?” The White House Situation Room fell silent. But the questions had their desired effect: those gathered began putting more thought into Pakistan as the key theater in the region.

Option 1a: Sending more troops to Afghanistan would actually make things worse in Pakistan. Russ Feingold:

Ending al Qaeda’s safe haven in Pakistan is a top national security priority. Yet our operations in Afghanistan will not do so, and they could actually contribute to further destabilization of Pakistan…

I asked the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, and Special Representative Richard Holbrooke, whether our troop increases might worsen instability in Pakistan. Adm. Mullen candidly said he shared that concern.

Mr. Holbrooke went even further. “You’re absolutely correct,” he said, “that an additional amount of American troops, and particularly if they’re successful in Helmand and Kandahar, could end up creating a pressure in Pakistan which would add to the instability.”

Option 2: Losing in Afghanistan empowers all of our adversaries in Pakistan. Chris Brose & Dan Twining:

Defeating the Taliban would help secure the greater U.S. goal: fostering a realization among the Pakistani military that their terrorist allies, washing in waves over the Pakistani border, are breaking against a hardened Afghan state, and that to continue backing violent extremists will only leave Pakistan isolated, insecure, and weakened. Ending Afghanistan’s status as a playing field for Pakistan’s military-intelligence forces will also weaken the security establishment’s influence in Pakistani politics, advancing the U.S. objective–shared by most Pakistanis–of strengthening civilian rule.