Lippmann’s Law
I’m not as prepared as Damir is to take for granted, even temporarily, Christian Brose’s statement that “we should not allow resources to determine strategy” in Afghanistan. Every time I try to take such statements for granted, the little realist devil on my shoulder sucker-punches the little idealist angel and whispers this classic Walter Lippmann quote in my ear:
Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitment, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.
This is not to say that Chris or the experts he was speaking to in Munich were delusional. Far from it. I think a democratic Afghanistan is worthy, wise and achievable goal. But we musn’t fall into the trap of thinking that if, say, $150 billion per year isn’t doing the trick, then surely $300 billion will. The time scale for successfully shepherding a stable and democratic regime in Afghanistan needs to be geological, involving the minimum amount of pressure on our part over a very long period of time.
There are of course no true historical parallels for what success looks like, but countries like Taiwan and South Korea are proofs of the concept that modest, short-term goals like stability and friendliness to the U.S., pursued over a long time frame, lead to success. Democracy won the day in those two places in a context in which the United States expended very few resources and exerted very little pressure to democratize them. Indeed at times the United States seemed to actually discourage democratic yearnings in favor of more urgent short-term interests.
That said, we should probably go to great lengths to avoid giving the impression that tough economic times are causing us to radically scale back our objectives in Afghanistan. That perception could be just as dangerous to our interests as doubling-down on a failed approach.