May 15, 2009

You not say Ukraine weak!

By: David Adesnik

Long ago, Seinfeld taught us the dangers of assuming Ukraine is weak. Yet the disappointing aftermath of the Orange Revolution has left many friends of the Ukraine wondering if the country can resist both internal tensions and Russian intimidation. The case for optimism is made by Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander Motyl in the current issue of Foreign Affairs [subscribers only]. They write:

Arseniy Yatseniuk, another presidential contender, who is touted by some as the Ukrainian Obama, was removed as speaker of parliament in November 2008 with the help of his former patron, [President] Yushchenko. An English speaker and someone who projects an image of a modern European politician, at 35, he has already served as an effective acting head of the central bank, economy minister, and foreign minister. A strong proponent of social liberalism and much admired by younger voters and entrepreneurs, Yatseniuk has injected a refreshing tone into Ukrainian politics by refraining from calumny and promoting competence and professionalism. Because he was jettisoned by the president and his allies, he has the reputation of an outsider — a highly valued commodity at a time when the public is likely to blame insiders for the economic downturn…

Systemic weakness means both that Ukraine’s flawed democracy is unlikely to fix itself in the short term and that the situation is equally unlikely to deteriorate. Ukraine is too fractured and too weak to have either a strong democracy or a strong dictatorship. Politically and economically, Ukraine will probably continue to muddle through, more or less as it has since 1991. The difference is that whereas muddling through may have been good enough in the 1990s, it no longer is today. Back then, Russia was weak and quiescent, its leadership was democratic, its relations with the West were generally good, and the world economy was growing. Today, Russia is standing tall after a long period of high growth, it is stronger and appears to be getting more aggressive, its leadership is authoritarian, its relations with the West are generally strained, and the world economy is in free fall. Just how Russia would respond to a further weakened and possibly brittle Ukraine is impossible to forecast with any accuracy, but given Russia’s regime type and its power today, a nondemocratic Russia might well take advantage of Ukraine’s increased weakness.

Europe and the United States must also understand that even with all its imperfections, Ukraine is not a failed state, nor is it likely to become one. Ukraine’s citizens have courageously defended their basic rights and created a society with a high degree of pluralism, political competition, and democratic practice. Of course, theirs is a flawed market economy tainted by corruption and cronyism and dominated by a few large oligarchic groups, which are in fierce competition with one another. But although it is a dysfunctional democracy and an imperfect market economy at present, Ukraine has all the building blocs to become a mature European market democracy.