On Peace in Ukraine
It is proper, morally right and just to seek peace in Ukraine (and everywhere). The Trump administration, therefore, is correct in seeking a way to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. Nonetheless, the question with wars is not solely on how to end the fighting, but how to prevent the war from being renewed at a later date. The question can be framed as, how do we achieve a lasting peace?
There are multiple facts to keep in mind as we follow President Trump’s peace overtures. For instance, Ukraine did not start the war, it was Russia. Ukrainians are not dying “for nothing” as some have claimed. In fact, they are fighting for what men have fought since time immemorial, their country, families and their countrymen. It is not unimaginable that, were Ukraine wholly to be conquered by Russia, the Ukrainians would continue to fight. Furthermore, one can be against the war continuing or American involvement without pretending that it’s a money laundering operation or that Russia is actually the victim. One can, as Michael Brendan Dougherty from National Review does, morally side with Ukraine without wanting continued American involvement.
A few more facts to recall: NATO expansion has been driven by Eastern European states seeking protection and deterrence from Russia. This is based on a realistic understanding of Russian geopolitical behavior. In the words of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, “Analysts frequently explain Russian expansionism as stemming from a sense of insecurity. But Russian writers have far more often justified Russia’s outward thrust as a messianic vocation. Russia on the march rarely showed a sense of limits; thwarted, it tended to withdraw into sullen resentment. For most of its history, Russia has been a cause looking for opportunity.”
Lastly, it is important to realize the following. There was a brief moment in time when it was possible for Ukraine to expel Russia from lots of its territory and seek a peace with honor in the Fall of 2022. That opportunity was lost. After the Ukrainian offensive stalled, Russia did what always happens in war, it adapted. After that brief window in which Ukraine could have pressed its advantage and negotiated from strength, the war devolved into one of attrition and became mostly static. Ukraine holds its own, and Russian gains cost, in the words of Jim Geraghty, “one Vietnam War’s worth of killed in action each calendar year.”
Therefore, as has been noted by Secretary Rubio, it seems highly unlikely that Russia can conquer all of Ukraine and it seems dubious that Ukraine will recover all of its pre-2014 territory. Add to that the support among Western publics for negotiations and peace, and it is no surprise that the time for peace negotiations has arrived.
Historically, it has been in America’s geopolitical interest to avoid the rise of hegemonic powers in either Asia or Europe. This is so that no power arises which can threaten America’s freedom, economic prosperity and physical security. Russia is a nuclear power that advances anti-American policies throughout the world and seeks to degrade American influence and strength. Same goes for China and Iran. As such, even though some Americans would like to abandon Europe completely, (a different thing to advocating for a rearmed Europe), it is questionable that America could do so. Russia, because of its size, nuclear arsenal, geopolitical aspirations and military power, will be of concern to the United States for the foreseeable future.
Therefore, what happens in Europe is of interest to us. We must also be aware that if Europe becomes completely independent of American security guarantees, then we will lose leverage over them and, who knows, they may become an unreliable ally. Nevertheless, from the American viewpoint it is time for peace. It is also true that though we seek and desire peace, the administration’s current policy seems to be tilting heavily to pressuring and berating Ukraine, while seeking to accommodate Russia in most of its interests with negotiations having barely begun and with no ascertainable Russian concessions yet. As the historian Niall Ferguson noted over at The Free Press, “Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said that Ukraine’s postwar borders were unlikely to be as they were before Russia initially invaded in 2014; that negotiations would not end with Ukraine as a NATO member; and that non-Americans would have to provide security guarantees. As those were three of Putin’s negotiating objectives, it seemed […] simply bizarre for the U.S. defense secretary to offer them up as freebies in return for nothing.”
Since then, as has been itemized by Jim Geraghty of National Review, the administration has announced that it is exploring easing sanctions on Russia to improve ties with Moscow; and military aid and intel sharing with Ukraine were paused, albeit they have resumed as of this writing. Moreover, the administration seems to have scaled back the degree of cooperation and joint exercises with NATO allies. This is all consistent with some Republicans’ support for ending all involvement as soon as possible. However, that policy preference begs the question, do they want a complete collapse of Ukraine? This is unlikely, but as Walter Russell Mead has written at The Wall Street Journal, “Mr. Trump believes that improved relations with Russia are necessary for the American revival he hopes to lead, and he is willing to pay a high, even stupefying, price in moral authority, alliance relations and Ukrainian territory to get his deal. Vladimir Putin understands this and will charge the U.S. accordingly.”
The goal of peace negotiations should be, in my view, not just peace but a peace that endures. In other words, not just a pause in fighting but an enduring end to hostilities. For that to happen, we must bear in mind Russia’s long history of broken promises and agreements, such as its complete refusal to respect the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and its historical behavior as an expansionist power that only stops when confronted with strength. Even now, how did Russia respond to President Trump’s goodwill efforts to improve relations? By not conceding anything, rejecting the American and Ukrannian ceasefire offer and increasing its demands.
For the peace to last and be honorable, as well as to meet America’s interests, it perhaps should meet the following criteria: First, some form of security guarantee is necessary for Ukraine, otherwise precedent indicates Russia will merely accept any peace as a pause and invade again at the most convenient opportunity. Were there to be a peace fully accomodating Russia, it is not inconceivable that it would be perceived by the Russian bear as weakness and as permission for further and further aggression and prodding of the Atlantic Alliance’s defenses and red lines. It is not in America’s interest for this to happen. Russia historically respects only strength. This is why the Alliance must remain firm.
Secondly, the peace will likely never be to the full satisfaction of Ukraine, but the peace must seek the survival of an independent Ukrainian state. As Ferguson remarked in his essay, “Ukraine minus Donbas and Crimea but with European security guarantees (in other words: soldiers), has a shot at being South Korea. The alternative is South Vietnam.” Whether we like it or not, the imperfect Ukrainian state is, at this juncture, an important factor in maintaining a balance of power in Europe, and to deter a growing appetite for Russian expansionism. To reiterate: America’s goal must be to avoid the rise of a hegemonic Russia and prevent the war from breaking out again. To achieve this, an independent Ukraine must be preserved, and with cooperation from other free nations, slowly be built up like South Korea was. Only a peace based on strength can endure, otherwise the war will eventually renew and the death-toll shall keep climbing.
A further consideration is the following: Can Russia be acquired as an ally to counter Communist China? Is this strategic goal possible?
Walter Russel Mead has warned: “In offering Mr. Putin explicit recognition of a sphere of interest in portions of the former Soviet Union including Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Armenia, Mr. Trump is making larger and more consequential concessions than his 21st-century predecessors tried in their own failed attempts to reach an understanding with Mr. Putin. […] The question is what comes next. Will both Russia and the U.S. honor Mr. Trump’s proposed grand bargain? Will these sweeping concessions produce the results Mr. Trump hopes they will?”
It is a fact that almost every American president during Putin’s reign has sought a reset of relations with him. It is also true that America and the West have sought to appease Russia. It was America that pressured Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for guarantees of their sovereignty, it was NATO that shelved expansion in 2008 to assuage Russian concerns, and Russia invaded Georgia and Ukraine anyway. In addition, President Obama cancelled missile defense in Eastern Europe, Europe kept buying Russian gas, etc. A litany of failed accommodations. In short, past attempts to appease Russia under Putin were not successful. As such, there is ample reason to be skeptical of the possibility of a realignment or an alliance with Russia.
In contrast to that policy of appeasement, during the first Trump administration Putin never invaded another country. The only exception to his conduct since 2000. Why? The reason is clear. President Trump followed a deterrence policy by arming Ukraine as much as possible, allowing Green Berets to battle and defeat Russian mercenaries, and pursuing a military build up, for example. The result was deterrence of Russian aggression and it is why President Trump has always been correct that if he had been president in 2022, there would not have been a war in the first place.
The goal of peace and strategic realignment is laudable, but if peace is dishonorable and without adequate deterrence or security guarantees, it will not hold. As for allying with Russia, it is doubtful whether that is even possible. In summary, peace must come through deterrence and an understanding of the adversary so they can be properly deterred. The administration is wise to seek an end to the war, though it should be wary of Russians bearing gifts. The doubt is not over the policy or the goal, it is over its present execution. I pray President Trump is successful in ending the war, permanently, and that he can, in fact, drive a wedge between the People’s Republic of China and Putin’s Russia. Nevertheless, we must always keep in mind what President Ronald Reagan might have counseled President Trump, when dealing with Russians always remember to “trust, but verify.“