Pointless Occupations: No Biggie?

Daniel responds to my take on McEmpire:

aside from being another occasion to say that popular opinion is no guide to making good policy I would add that the frequent comparisons made between a long-term presence in Iraq and other long-term presences in Korea, Germany and elsewhere makes for an exceptionally good reason to leave Iraq immediately. It is clear that people easily become accustomed to the idea of long-term presences in other countries, which is why they should not be given the time to get accustomed to the idea. The long-term deployments in Korea, Germany and elsewhere, whatever legitimate and appropriate purpose they once served, are no longer necessary. A long-term presence in Iraq is not now and never will be necessary, so whether or not “the American people” will accept it misses the point: they have continued to accept long-term deployments and alliances long after these became obsolete, which suggests that the people’s willingness to accept outdated and unnecessary policies should not be a factor in embarking on a genuinely foolish and costly course of action.

Well yes, yes, agreed: but the main thrust of my observation is that pointless occupations with low costs are basically no big deal — at least as the practical American public is concerned. I do not want to replace sound policymaking with ´whatever works´ according to (uninformed) public opinion. But I do want to try to lower the stakes a little in the Iraq debate. We should thank God that America is powerful and successful and resilient enough to rebound from huge mistakes, indeed to hardly even suffer the consequences. (This is nowhere more true than in the budget: yet trillions of deficit spending might be easy for five years and impossible for ten.)

Really the bottom line may be that realizing just how resilient America is should humble us immensely by revealing how especially susceptible to clumsy adventures we are. In lieu of fate punishing us for our stupidity, we should have the grace to restrain ourselves; we shouldn´t work ourselves into a graceless frenzy trying to strike the right tone of agonized repentance. Iraq is not some great hinge in world history. It´s a contingent outplaying of many bottled-up and brewing narratives left over from the 1990s.

That doesn´t mean we should be cavalier about our Iraq policy. It does mean that we don´t have to amp up the drama in order to indulge our sense of guilt at the feeling of being underpunished for acting so irresponsibly. The drama clouds the thinking we need to manage our denouement practically.