Restless Bombs Syndrome
That hard-to-describe tingly sensation experienced when your policy options short of force aren’t working. We all feel it. But reactions to Restless Bombs Syndrome may vary, both person-by-person and case-by-case. Striking a collegial contrast with my own stated symptoms, Sonny lays his out as follows:
James admits that Iranians are killing Americans (albeit in Iraq) and suggests leafletting the Iranian camps, telling them to knock it off or face the consequences. Makes sense, except for the fact that we’ve been telling the Iranians to knock it off for some time now, going so far as to capture Iranian actors in Iraq to get the point across. Nothing has come of these attempts to get Iran to stop. As far as I can tell, this leaves Bush and the DOD with three options, none of them good.
- Do nothing, and allow Iranians to keep killing American soldiers and Iraqi allies.
- Continue to tell Iran to knock it off, drop leaflets on Iranian soldiers, and hope for the best. (Functionally this seems to me to be identical to option one.)
- Bomb Iranian training camps in the hopes it will deter further incursions.
For the record, I don’t think the third option will accomplish its stated goal, and could backfire by rallying the Iranian people behind Ahmadinejad, emboldening him to strike the U.S. more openly. But option one and option two haven’t really worked either, now have they? Is it really so outlandish to suggest a show of force? Furthermore, isn’t an action like Bolton is suggesting at the heart of the post-9/11 mindset…that we will neither tolerate terrorism nor the states that house and train and support terrorists? Plus, what do we have to gain by taking military strikes off the table? Why not rattle the sabers a little in the hopes that bold talk will bluff them into folding?
Admittedly, my characterization of Bolton’s as a pre-9/11 mindset was mostly a joke designed to lighten the mood. That aside, strangely, it’s deja vu all over again: I continue to wholeheartedly agree with the underlying logic here but deny that the conclusion follows. I too am annoyed that current policy isn’t getting the job done. Also, as a matter of sheer general principles, I’m a big fan of saber-rattling — so much so that I prefer it instinctively to saber slicing, dicing, poking, and prodding. That said, when it’s prudent and proper to put one’s saber to use, I tend to consent to military action.
In this case, however, it still strikes me that bombing Iran is simply an act of frustration, not a policy. Sonny seems to be arguing that because all three of our options suck, we might as well pick the suckiest one and hope it might trigger the least sucky consequences. I freely admit that sometimes this implausible gamble might turn out to be the only possible or preferable choice. But it always seems to smack of desperation, impatience, or both. And Iran is not the place and now is not the time for that choice. I’m not persuaded that (at this juncture) the trouble Iran is causing us now is greater than the trouble Iran would very soon be causing us after a bombing campaign of whatever scope and size you like.
Still, I don’t like it when American servicepersons are killed, and any opportunity to humble or check the Iranian military in a proper and prudent way that redounds to our national benefit is attractive by default. So I suggested humbling the Iranian regime on the world stage and simultaneously checking at least a few of its hydra heads by doing what’s basically a real bombing run with bombs that contain ‘hand-delivered’ warnings instead of concentrated explosives. It was pretty embarrassing for Iran to get its operatives captured in Iraq. But it really should be expected that we can figure out what’s going down in Iraq and are capable of acting on that information. What would be less expected — as a matter of pride, if not logic — is the action in Iran that I’m putting forward mainly as a thought experiment.
Saber-rattling is fun, easy, and relatively cheap. That’s why there are two carrier groups in the Gulf right now, and that — I think — is why my plan makes better sense than rolling the dice on a real live shooting war. My plan doesn’t solve anything, of course, whereas the only thing the bombing plan solves is the annoying problem of having to make a decision. Before we start kicking things, we should remember that doing so won’t bring an end to Restless Bombs Syndrome — and might just intensify it.