Thinking Ukraine Through: Part 2
This will be a 4-part series where Rodney Rios breaks down the Russian war against Ukraine.
Former President Richard Nixon argued in his book Beyond Peace back in the 1990s that Russia must be one of the centers of America’s foreign policy attention since Russia was destined to regain strength as a great power and, moreover, Russia is the one nation on earth that had the capacity to destroy the United States physically many times over. One can clearly see then that Russia is, no matter how weak it might be, an important interest of American foreign policy in line with the explanation of physical security as part of America’s interest.
Preventing Russian dominance of Europe is clearly in America’s interest, as is impeding the collapse of the balance of power and peace in Europe, which would be the result of American disengagement in the region. For example, a collapse of the post-Cold War order might form a renewed German-Russia great power rivalry, with Eastern Europe as the playground once again. History shows what happens when Germany and Russia clash.
Alternatively, American isolation and retreat could lead to a Russian-dominated Europe, a Europe under the power or an anti-American, aggressive, and hostile regime. Is that in America’s interest? The consequences of a unilateral retreat, advocated by those who unilaterally want to cut off all aid to Ukraine, could lead to a similar situation as at the end of the Vietnam War. William Inboden has related in a recent book that during the 1970s, the United States faced a situation in which it was losing the Cold War vs. the Soviet Union.
The Vietnam loss, provoked in large part by isolationist Democrats who favored unilateral disengagement and abandonment of an ally, together with multiple other factors, caused the United States to be on the defensive during most of the 1970s. Strategically, as Mark Moyar explained, the loss of South Vietnam to the communists fed regional instability by eroding confidence in U.S. commitment to its allies, triggering the realignment of regional powers, and influencing conflicts in countries like Cambodia and Laos. The loss provoked a crisis of confidence in the free world, with a decline of American leadership and advancements for the communist world and, specifically, the Soviet Union. The world looked very unsafe during those years. It took a drastic course correction under President Ronald Reagan for the United States to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.
Unilateral disengagement, especially after so much credibility has been invested in Ukraine, would potentially lead to similar results. World orders rarely collapse dramatically; for the most part, they are chipped away by revisionist powers. This has been the aspiration of Putin’s Russia for a long time and the aspiration of Communist China, Iran, and other lesser powers.
As such, let us examine the Ukraine problem. President Nixon argued that in matters between Ukraine-Russia, the United States had to seek to balance between them, not being reflexively either pro-Russia or Ukraine, unless one attacks the other. As Nixon wrote:
What matters to the United States is not so much the particular outcome of their disputes as that they are settled amicably. Over time, our involvement in this relationship will be as important in ensuring regional peace as was our role in bringing about improved relations between Israel and the Arab states. Two diametrically opposite possibilities loom along the Russian-Ukrainian border. […] Ukraine’s history of domination by Moscow would seem to make the unhappier prospect the more likely one. United States policy should be designed to ensure that both sides realize that the happier prospect is in their interests.
Nixon was right, and I think it is fair to say that American policy toward Russia failed. The United States failed to deter or avoid a resurgence of Russian expansionism and an aggressive foreign policy. America had a long and sorry record of seeking to appease Russia, especially under Vladimir Putin, to no avail. For example, the United States pressured Ukraine to relinquish its nuclear arsenal, creating, as John Mearsheimer argued at the time, a security vacuum for Ukraine which made it indispensable for the Ukrainians to seek NATO admission to counteract the very likely possibility that Russia would return to its historic behavior as an aggressive power.
The United States then acquiesced in the agreement between Poland and Russian President Boris Yeltsin to allow NATO expansion into central European states, as long as there was no insistence on Ukraine’s admission, leaving a geopolitical vacuum in the area. One effective way to deter Russian aggression has been NATO expansion, and for that reason, NATO and the Atlantic Alliance remain valued instruments to keep the peace in Europe. For example, it was a mistake of the Alliance during the Bucharest Summit in 2008 to offer eventual NATO admission to Georgia and Ukraine without any real intention of following through. It gave Putin an excuse to invade Georgia and create a frozen conflict in that nation. It was the worst of all worlds; the United States and the alliance should never invest its credibility if it is not willing to follow through. If there was no intention of admitting these nations into NATO, as seems to be the case, the offer should not have been made.
Stay tuned for Part III.